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THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION:
"AMPARO" AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN
REMEDIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
Pedro Pablo Camargo*
INTRODUCTION
The American Convention on Human Rights, signed by twelve
American States at the closing session of the Inter-American Specialized
Conference on Human Rights, held in San Josi, Costa Rica, November
7 to 22, 1969, recognizes the right to judicial protection.1
Article 25 of this Convention provides:
"Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any
other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for pro-
tection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized
by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Con-
vention, even though such violation may have been committed by
persons acting in the course of their official duties."
Forms of judicial protection in the American States include the
amparo, writ of habeas corpus, mandado de seguranqa and other judicial
devices specially designed to protect human rights.
This paper describes how the right to judicial protection is recognized
in the legal systems of Latin America. Reference is made not only to the
amparo of Mexico - also adopted by some twelve Latin American
countries2 - but also to other Latin American legal devices which speci.
fically protect human rights, such as the writ of habeas corpus, the
mandado de seguranca, the judicial review, and the people's action against
unconstitutional laws, among others.
It appears opportune to describe the characteristics of the Mexican
or Latin American amparo now that the American States are attempting
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to establish an international machinery to protect human rights similar
to that found in Western Europe among the Member States of the Council
of Europe3. The word amparo is roughly translated as protection, but
because of its special legal significance, it is used in its Spanish form in
this study.
The amparo is a legal device which, in the author's view, best fulfills
the provisions of Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
This article states:
"Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law."
Moreover, the author believes that it would be useful for jurists of
other legal systems to become familiar with Latin American legal devices
specifically designed to protect human rights. This is important in order
to establish some comparisons with similar legal devices in the United States
of America, such as judicial review, writ of habeas corpus, writ of certi-
orari, mandamus and injunction.
SOME PROCEDURAL INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA
It is unquestionable that the American and French Revolutions, by
proclaiming the equality of all men and the existence of some fundamental
human rights and liberties, initiated an era of legal recognition of civil and
political rights. Following the liberal principle that the purpose of the state
is to protect individual liberties, modern constitutional law in the Western
Hemisphere has adopted various judicial devices for safeguarding such
liberties.$
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the third paragraph
of its preamble, expresses that "it is essential, if man is not to be com-
pelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law."'
Professor Grant stated the problem in this manner: "History has
shown that a mere right without the support of law is no more than a
declaration on paper. The main problem of Constitutional Law is to find a
practical way to assure the individual of a complete and effective protec-
tion against arbitrary excess of government. " 7
Thus, since the beginning of their existence as independent nations,
the Latin American countries, inspired by the liberal constitutional exam-
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ples of France and the United States, embodied in their own constitutions
similar bills of civil and political rights.' Also, they consecrated some
constitutional guarantees in order that these rights would be legally
protected.
In Mexico, for instance, the term "individual guarantees," to designate
constitutional civil rights, appeared in the Yucatan State Constitution of
1841, and these guarantees were definitely recognized in the Federal
Constitutions of 1857 and 1917. 9
In spite of the above, the introduction of "guarantees" to protect
civil rights and liberties was a gradual victory of constitutional law in
Latin America. The legal protection of human rights was at first limited
to the Anglo-American writ of habeas corpus to protect individual freedom
against arbitrary arrest. Eventually, other constitutional instruments were
adopted, such as the judicial review, the judicial responsibility of public
authorities, and the amparo. All of these remedies at present make up
what the Italian jurist, Mauro Capelletti, has called "the constitutional
jurisdiction of liberty.""
In the Seminar of Amparo, Habeas Corpus and Other Similar Rem-
edies, held in Mexico in August 1961, sponsored by the United Nations,
it was recognized that the American countries which inherited the English
juridical traditions use the writ of habeas corpus to protect individual
liberty and freedom of movement, but also employ a series of special
recourses, such as certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and injunction,
among others. On the other hand, the countries which base their institu-
tions on Roman Law, are divided into three general groups: 1) Those
utilizing amparo: this recourse protects not only individual liberty and
freedom movement, but also all the other fundamental civil rights; 2) those
utilizing a broadened habeas corpus; this recourse, broader than the U.S.
habeas corpus, protects not only individual liberty and freedom of move-
ment, but is extended to include other civil rights as well; and, 3) those
utilizing both the amparo and the habeas corpus: these countries protect
individual liberty and freedom of movement by means of habeas corpus
and protect other civil rights by means of other remedies, such as amparo
in Mexico and mandado deseguranap in Brazil.'1
The Mexican jurist, Hector Fix Zamudio, considers that, even though
it is true that all judicial means are useful for the protection of human
rights, nevertheless, it is necessary to give priority "to those which have
proved their efficacy in the rapid and sure protection of human liberty."12
In the opinion of this jurist, only the following should be considered as
"adequate means" for protecting the fundamental rights and liberties in
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Latin America: the writ of habeas corpus, amparo in Mexico and other
countries, mandado de seguranga in Brazil, and judicial review of the
constitutionality of law violating fundamental rights.
Before considering amparo, it is useful to analyze briefly the princi-
pal constitutional remedies for the protection of civil rights existing in the
constitutional regimes of Latin America.
A. Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus is one of the traditional and inherent
remedies for the direct protection of fundamental rights and liberties. This
is a customary device in the common law system. It was codified by the
Habeas Corpus of Great Britain as early as 1640. This institution was
embodied in the Constitution of the United States, in the second paragraph
of Section 9 of Article I, which states: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the Public Safety may require it."
The writ of habeas corpus, conceived as a remedy to protect individual
liberty against arbitrary arrest, was incorporated gradually in Latin
American constitutions. Sanchez Viamonte says that practically all the
Latin American constitutions in force contain this instrument. 13 Colombia
was the last country to adopt an Act of Habeas Corpus. 14
In spite of the fact that habeas corpus (also called writ of "personal
presence" or amparo-libertad) is recognized in all Latin American con-
stitutions,15 this instrument does not have the same legal significance in
each country. The commonality lies in that it is a brief, simple and rapid
procedure for safeguarding individual liberty against arbitrary arrest. In
the United States the writ of habeas corpus was, until a few years ago, an
effective remedy only to protect individual liberty against administrative
authorities.16 But, at present, the writ of habeas corpus has been converted
into a broader recourse - practically an amparo - in criminal law, when
no other adequate recourse exists, such as an appeal 7
Mexico, in effect, embodied the writ of habeas corpus, but under the
name of amparo, in the "Amendment Act" of 1847, in Article 25.18 This
recourse is called amparo-libertad.
In Peru, the habeas corpus has a broader meaning: it is used not only
to protect individual liberty against arbitrary detention, but also to protect
other civil and social rights.
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B. The Brazilian "Mandado de Seguranga"
In order to broaden the writ of habeas corpus protecting individual
liberty against arbitrary arrest, the Brazilian Constitution of 1934 created
the writ called "mandado de seguranca" (mandamus of protection), for
the purpose of jurisdictionally protecting the other fundamental rights and
guarantees recognized by the Constitution (Article 113, paragraph 33).
This instrument, however, was only an ordinary legal remedy while the
Civil Procedure Code of 1939 was in force.
This device was definietly consolidated in the Brazilian Constitution
of 1946 (Article 141, paragraph 24). In Article 150, the new Constitution
of 1967 ratified the mandado de seguranqa in the following terms:
The mandamus of protection will be granted to protect individual
rights purely and simply, which are not covered by habeas corpus,
regardless of who the authority responsible for the illegality or abuse
of powers might be.
The mandado de seguranqa is intended to protect the inviolability of
civil rights concerning life, liberty, individual safety and property recog-
nized in the Brazilian Constitution.
The mandado de segurawca may be invoked against acts of adminis-
trative authorities. But, in exceptional cases, it has been used to impugn
judiciai decisions wheni there is no other adequate remedy. It has also
been used in a preventive way against so-called "pressure groups", such
as labor unions, which have legal status.
Professor Fix Zamudio maintains that the mandado de seguranga is
"an extraordinary procedure for the rapid and efficient protection of
human rights against illegality or abuse of power of any authority, but
especially administrative authorities."'
C. Judicial Review in Latin America
Judicial control of the constitutionality of laws "developed in Latin
America due to the influx of United States doctrines and jurisprudence."20
Its legal basis is paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding. 21
The basic rule of the "American system" is that there is no special
system to determine constitutionality, such as there is, for example, in
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Austria (European system). The question of the constitutionality of a law
or decree is decided as cases arise. Any judge has not only the power, but
also the duty, to apply the Constitution over and above any other law or
decree. There is no specific tribunal that initially decides on the constitu-
tionality of laws. Thus, the courts have the power to consider as null and
void any law, regulation, decree or act which is contrary to the Constitu-
tion.
The U.S. Supreme Court is not simply a constitutional tribunal such
as the Verfassungsrichsho/ or Constitutional Court of Austria. However, it
does have the power, as the supreme tribunal of the Union, to resolve,
either as a result of appeal or through certiorari, fundamental constitu-
tional questions derived from a lids presented to it by the interested parties.
Since the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, the U.S.
Supreme Court has admitted the declaratr y action by which the parties
may solicit a decision from the highest tisbunal concerning the constitu-
tionality of a law which as yet has not been applied to them, but which
affects their legal interests.
Beginning with their first constitutions, the Latin American countries
have adopted the system of judicial review from the United States,22 and
have placed such jurisdiction in the hands of the judges or their Supreme
Courts. 23
The general procedure consists of a declaration a posteriori requested
by the involved party in a specific suit; but this declaration of uncon-
stitutionality does not derogate the law attacked with effects erga omnes.
An exceptional procedure, existing in Colombia, declares the unconstitu-
tionality not only with effects erga omnes, but also produces the derogation
of the law.
Judicial review, however, has varied in the Latin American countries.
Cuba, Ecuador and Guatemala, at various times, modified their legislation
in order to create special tribunals - such as in the system introduced
by Kelsen in the Austrian Constitution of 1920 - to determine constitu-
tionality.24
Cuba created in its Constitution of 1940 the Tribunal of Social and
Constitutional Guarantees, which had jurisdiction to pass on the uncon-
stitutionality of laws (Article 182, paragraph a) and to give advisory
opinions as requested by judges and tribunals concerning unconstitution-
ality (Article 182, paragraph b). This system was taken from the Spanish
Republican Constitution of 1931. Furthermore, Cuba adopted from Colom-
bia the people's action against unconstitutional laws. This action could be
invoked not only by those in jeopardy but also by any 25 citizens signing
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a petition. In Cuba the declaration of the unconstitutionality of a law by
the above mentioned tribunal, implied the derogation of that law.
The Fundamental Law of the Republic of Cuba of 1959 partially re-
tained this system and gave jurisdiction to the above mentioned tribunal
to pass judgment "on the recourses of unconstitutionality of laws, decree-
laws, decrees, resolutions or acts which deny, lessen, restrict or diminish
the rights and guarantees stated in this Fundamental Law or which impede
the free functioning of the state organs.
'25
In its Constitution of 1967, Ecuador re-established the Tribunal of
Constitutional Guarantees, which had been created by the Constitution of
1945 and abolished in 1946. However, the Ecuadoran Constitution of 1967
has been abrogated. 26
Finally, the Constitution of Guatemala of 1965 created a Court of
Constitutionality, made up of twelve magistrates, five of whom are members
of the Supreme Court. This court has jurisdiction over actions designed to
test laws or general government regulations which may be unconstitutional
wholly, or in part. The proceeding may be initiated by the Council of
State, the Bar Association, the Public Attorney at the request of the
President of the Republic, or by any person or legal entity, as long as
the unconstitutionality of the law or governmental measure affects the
person or entity directly. The decision of the Court has general effects,
so that the unconstitutional dispositions are invalidated. This procedure,
which is covered by Articles 262, 263 and 264 of the Guatemalan Con-
stitution, has been set forth in detail in the "Constitutional Law of Amparo,
Habeas Corpus and Constitutionality" of May 4, 1964 (Chapter X, The
Recourse of Unconstitutionality).
In summary, judicial review in Latin America, whether or not it is
based on the "American system" or the "European system" (Austrian
Constitutional Court), is a means for the protection of human rights
against laws or decrees that may be contrary to the constitutions.
D. The People's Action Against Unconstitutionality of Laws
The People's Action consists of the privilege enjoyed by every citizen
to appear before the Supreme Court of Justice to impugn the unconstitu.
tionality of a law, even though he may not be directly affected by such a
law. This procedure originated in Colombia, and is fundamentally an
institution used in the countries which previously formed "Great Colombia"
(Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela).
In this procedure, when the Supreme Court declares a law to be
unconstitutional, it produces effects erga omata, resulting in the derogation
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of the law. Furthermore, this procedure incorporates an a priori deter-
mination of the constitutionality of legislative bills rejected by the execu-
tive branch.27
The Political Constitution of New Granada (Colombia) of May 21,
1853, empowered the Supreme Court to decide the validity of municipal
ordinances vis-h-vis the Constitution or the laws of the Republic. Any
citizen was entitled to present the claim before the Supreme Court. The
Colombian Constitution of 1858 gave power to the Supreme Court to
suspend the execution of acts of the state legislatures whenever they were
contrary to the Constitution or the laws of the Confederation; the Supreme
Court gave notice of the suspension to the Senate so that it could decide
definitely on the validity or nullity of such acts (Article 51). The Colom-
bian Constitution of 1863 gave powers to the Supreme Court to suspend,
upon appropriate request from the Attorney General or any citizen, the
execution of legislative acts of the state assemblies (Article 72).
Amendment Act No. 3 of 1910, which reformed the Constitution of
1886- presently in force - introduced the People's Action to test the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 214 of the Colombian Constitution states:
The Supreme Court of Justice is charged with safeguarding the
integrity of the Constitution. Consequently, besides the powers given
to it by this Constitution and the laws, it will have the following
power: to decide definitely on the compatibility of the legislative bills
which have been objected to by the Government as unconstitutional,
or on all the laws or decrees promulgated by the Government in the
performance of the duties stated in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article
76 and Article 121 of the Constitution when any citizen impugns
such unconstitutionality.?$
The People's Action to test the constitutionality of laws was introduced
in the Venezuelan Constitution of 1853. The Venezuelan Constitution of
1961 gives power to the Supreme Court to declare that a law or any other
act of the legislative body is unconstitutional wholly or in part, and to
decide on the validity of state laws, municipal ordinances and other acts
of municipal deliberating bodies (Article 215, paragraphs 3 and 4). A
Court declaration of unconstitutionality results in the derogation of such
dispositions.
In 1869, Ecuador adopted the same system. However, the Constitution
of 1967 transferred the power to test the validity of laws in a people's
action from the Supreme Court to the Tribunal of Constitutional Guaran-
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tees. But, since the Ecuadoran Constitution of 1967 has been abrogated,
the above mentioned tribunal does not have jurisdiction "to pass judgment
on the complaints of violation of the Constitution or laws presented by any
real or artificial person" (Article 220, paragraph 3).
The People's Action has also become popular in other Latin American
countries.
In 1904, Panama adopted this proceeding. The constitutions of 1941
and 1946 (Article 167, paragraph 1 of the latter) reaffirmed the system.
The "Law of Constitutional Recourses and Guarantees", of November 24,
1956, sets forth in detail the various devices of constitutional control:
habeas corpus, the amparo of constitutional guarantees (to protect other
individual rights), the "objection of incompatibility" (against bills and
constitutional amendments), the "advisory opinion on constitutionality",
and the "recourse of unconstitutionality".
Peru's Constitution of 1933 also established the People's Action, not
to test the validity of laws, but rather to test the validity of regulations
and other general governmental resolutions or decrees which could infringe
the Constitution or the laws (Article 133). The Organic Law of the
Judicial Branch of July 25, 1963 provided for judicial review, so that
judges or tribunals could give preference to constitutional dispositions over
and above other legal dispositions (Article 8).
In Cuba, beginning with the Constitution of 1931, the People's Action
was permitted; such an action could be undertaken, not only by those
affected, but also by any group of 25 citizens signing a petition (Article
194, paragraph b). The Tribunal of Constitutional and Social Guarantees
had the power to derogate unconstitional laws. But the Fundamental Law
of Cuba of February 7, 1959, suppressed the People's Action, since an
action to test constitutionality was granted exclusively to "any real or
artificial person who has been affected by an act or disposition which he
may consideF unconstitutional" (Article 160).
The Constitution of El Salvador of 1962 gives power to the Supreme
Court to declare a law, decree or regulation unconstitutional "in its form
and content, in a general and obligatory manner, and can do so at the
petition of any citizen" (Article 96). This system was incorporated in
the Constitution of 1950.
E. The Amparo as a Means of Control of the Constitutionality of
Laws
This institution appeared in Article 25 of the Amendment Act of 1847
of the Mexican Federal Constitution of 1824, and is known by the name
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"Otero's formula." This legal device permits the challenge, by means of
amparo, of any law considered to be unconstitutional. This action can only
be taken by the aggrieved party, and the effects of the decision of uncon-
stitutionality are not erga omnes, but rather apply to the specific case and
are for the benefit of the party involved. Besides, the declaration of
unconstitutionality does not derogate the law.
In the beginning, this system influenced several Central American
countries, although recently it has been discarded. Only three countries
retain this method of judicial review: Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala.
F. Le Contenteux-Administratif
Another legal instrument for the protection of human rights against
public administrative acts, is the administrative jurisdiction (contenrieux
administratil), giving the power to annul, suspend or amend such acts.29
There are three systems of administrative jurisdiction: The first, which
is typically jurisdictional, consists of giving to ordinary judicial tribunals
the administrative jurisdiction as a means of controlling public adminis-
trative acts which injure the rights of private persons. Argentina, Boliva,
Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela have
adopted this system, following the early practice of the United States
(especially prior to the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act),
but with variants and adaptations peculiar to each country.
The second consists of giving administrative jurisdiction to an ad-
ministrative body which has jurisdictional functions. The Conseil dEtaf
and the administrative tribunals do so in France. This system, however,
has not had many followers in Latin America. Only Colombia has a State
Council, which besides being the supreme tribunal in administrative
jurisdiction is the highest consultative body of the state in administrative
matters.
The third, called the mixed system, consists of giving administrative
jurisdiction to jurisdictional bodies which are not only independent from
the Judicial Branch but also from the Public Administration. In Latin
America the following countries have this system: Uruguay and Ecuador
with their Tribunals de lo Contencioso-Administrativo; and Chile, with
its administrative tribunals.
G. The "Action of Guarantees"
This is a new judicial recourse to protect human rights recognized by
some of the constitutions. In general, it consists of a public action available
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to anyone to prosecute officials accused of violating constitutional rights
and guarantees.
This is a typical action in Guatemala. The Guatemalan Constitution
of 1965, provides:
The action to prosecute those responsible for violations of rights
and guarantees included in this part of the Constitution, is public
and may be initiated by simple denunciation, without any bond or
other special formality (Article 78).
The Constitution of Honduras of 1965 reproduces in similar wording
the Guatemalan provision.
ACTION, RECOURSE AND CLAIM OF AMPARO IN MEXICO
Several Mexican authors, when they refer to the amparo, affirm-
and this is understandable-that this institution is "the most efficient and
adequate procedural instrument for the specific protection of human rights
stipulated in the Constitution." 30
This opinion is theoretically valid if two factors are taken into
consideration:
First, the Mexican amparo-initially conceived as a recourse to protect
"individual guarantees" only-has also had to be used to fill in some
constitutional gaps. Certainly, the Mexican amparo has had to be used
as a writ of habeas corpus, as an indirect means of judicial review, as an
extraordinary recourse of legality (due process of law), as a recourse of
cassation, and even as a special recourse of administrative jurisdiction
(contentieux administratil). Perhaps because of this, Professor Ignacio
Burgoa has said that this institution has become "denaturalized." 31
Second, the Mexican amparo is at present the legal device which
serves, in some degree, as a barrier against abuses, prevarications and
corruptions in the administration of justice. It is said that the "claim of
araparo" is the last bastion of the administration of justice in Mexico.
However, the Mexican amparo is not, in practice, as quick and efficient as
it has been claimed to be. For instance, the Supreme Court and the Circuit
Tribunals are at present delayed by a large backlog of cases.
The Mexican Constitutional Law Professor, Felipe Tena Ramirez, has
stated that amparo, aside from its normal function of protecting human
rights, has the following additional objectives.32
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1. To defend the Federal system against the interference of state
sovereignties in the federal sphere and vice versa, when such interference
results in detriment to any private interest.
2. To defend the integrity of the Federal Constitution when its
violation concurrently implies violation of an "individual guarantee."
3. To defend the correct application of the law in civil, criminal,
administrative and labor suits, according to Article 14 of the Mexican
Constitution.
4. To defend the "individual guarantees" which the Constitution
expressly sets forth in criminal matters.
5. To defend private persons against the illegal acts of the Public
Administration.
In summary, the Mexican amparo, takes the form of a claim before
the federal tribunals. 3" The claimant is always a person, i.e., the victim
or potential victim of violations of constitutional rights and fundamental
liberties, whether or not such violation has already been perpetrated or
is likely to be perpetrated at some time in the future. The defendant is
always a "responsible authority", defined as one who "dictates, orders,
executes or intends to execute the law or the act impugned" (Article 11
of the Law of Amparo). There is no public hearing, but rather the case
is reviewed by the Supreme Court or the Circuit Tribunals. Decisions are
designed to prevent or correct the specific infraction impugned, exclusively
in favor or against the person who has presented the claim. The decision
is binding only on the parties involved in the litigation.
With these basic concepts in mind, we may begin the study of the
Mexican amparo:
A. Origin
The plea of amparo appeared for the first time in the Mexican Federal
Constitution of February 5, 1857, and its objective was to protect the in-
dividual in federal tribunals against legislative, administrative or jurisdic-
tional acts in violation of individual rights included in the first 29 articles
of the Constitution.3
Nevertheless, the historical background of the amparo dates back to
the Draft Constitution of the State of Yucatan prepared in 184 by Manuel
Crescendo Rejon, who proposed the amparo in order to protect human
rights against laws, decrees, or acts of legislative and executive bodies
which were contrary to the Constitution. 35 This device was included in
the Yucatan State Constitution of 1841.36
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Subsequent to the Yucatan State Constitution, the "Amendment Act"
to the Mexican Federal Constitution of 1824, as promulgated in 1847,
included the amparo in Article 25, drafted by Mariano Otero as follows:
The Federal Tribunal will protect any person in the exercise and
conservation of the rights which are given to him by this Constitution
and by constitutional laws, against any attack from the legislative or
executive branches, either Federal or State; but these Tribunals will
be limited to providing protection only in the specific case under
consideration, without making any general declaration on the law or
act impugned.37
In this way, the amparo attained its definite status as a constitutional
institution and its scope of action was broadened, since it was no longer
used solely as a device for the protection of civil rights embodied in the
first 29 Articles of the Constitution, but also as a means of preventing
federal interference with State sovereignty and vice versa.
However, the actual use of the amparo started after the Mexican
Republic had been consolidated following the episodes of the French in-
tervention and civil strife. The First Law of Amparo passed in 1861, had
limited application. In practice, it was not until 1867 that the amparo was
used as a remedy analogous to that of the writ of habeas corpus against
illegal arrest and confiscation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court started to use the amparo to review
"due process of law", as a result of its broad interpretation of Article 14
of the Constitution, 38 taken almost verbatim from the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States." That is to say, amparo was also
converted into a system of "control of legality and constitutionality."
Professor Vallarta considered that Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution
should only be applied to criminal cases. But the Supreme Court was to
"give in to the temptation of extending its power and succeeded in broaden-
ing the meaning of Article 14."4 0 The Federal Constitution of February 5,
1917, adopted this judicial "amparo" with all its effects as stated in
Article 14.41
In accordance with this historical precedent in the Mexican Constitu.
tion of 1917 (whose Article 103 is almost identical to Article 101 of the
Mexican Constitution of 1857), the Law of Amparo of 1919 was promul.
gated, establishing the principles of relativity of decisions and "personal
damage" as characteristic elements of this legal device. The Supreme Court
and the District Judges shared jurisdiction in such cases.
The Law of Amparo of December 30, 1935 (amended in 1951, 1963
and 1968) sets forth the characteristics of this institution:
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1. The federal tribunals shall take cognizance of: a) all controversies
arising out of laws or acts of public authorities which violate any personal
guarantee; b) all controversies arising out of laws or acts of the federal
authorities which limit or encroach upon sovereignty of the states; and,
c) all controversies arising out of laws or acts of state authorities which
invade the sphere of action of the federal authorities.
2. An action of amparo may only be brought by a party who is
injured by a law, act or decision which is claimed to be invalid. When
amparo is used as a final appeal to impugn a decision made in a suit
between two private parties, the parties in the amparo proceeding are
three: 1) the agraviado: party injured by the lower court decision; 2) the
"responsible authority": the defendant judge who rendered the decision;
and, 3) the tercero perjudicado: the party favored by the lower court
decision.
3. The proceedings are entirely in writing without oral presenta-
tions. The decision is final and obligatory only for the parties involved in
the litigation and does not decide with effects erga omnes the validity of
the law, only the specific case. However, the final decision may be attacked
only by means of revision, complaint or protest.42 The amparo may not
be used against government-subsidized independent enterprises,43 corpora-
tions in which the states participate, or the National Autonomous Uni-
versity of Mexico.
B. The Five Aspects o the Mexican Amparo
The Mexican amparo is not only broad, but also complex in structure.
Professor Fix Zamudio, maintains that this institution has five separate
variants: amparo-libertad, the amparo against laws, amparo-casaciin, am.
paro administrativo, and the agrarian amparo.44 In practice, however, the
amparo is only one instrument.
Let us examine briefly these five aspects:
1. Amparo-libertad (writ of habeas corpus)
As already mentioned, the writ of habeas corpus was embodied in the
Mexican Constitutional system under the name of amparo in the Amend-
ment Act of 1847, to protect individual freedom against arbitrary arrest.
Even though the amparo is a device to protect all the civil rights contained
in the Mexican Constitution, when it fulfills functions analogous to the
writ of habeas corpus, in legal terminology it is called amparo-libertad."
Theoretically, it consists of a special, simple and rapid procedure, different
therefore from the amparo procedures established to protect other civil
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rights. In practice, however, it is not such a quick and effective procedure
as might be expected.
Some Mexican authors have established a parallel between the amparo-
libertad and the writ of habeas corpus of Anglo-American law.45 Other
authors, on the contrary, have said that amparo-libertad was inspired by
Spanish Law." The writer believes, however, that amparo.liberlad was
taken from the Anglo-American habeas corpus, since the Spanish Arago-
nian amparo was not included in the Spanish Law of the Indies.47 In the
writer's view, amparo-libertad is, in theory, the same as the writ of habeas
corpus, but the terminology and practices are different.
After the amparo was included in the Mexican Federal Constitution
of 1857, the procedure was divided into two main branches: first, the
amparo-libertad as a remedy against "acts which signify danger or loss
of life, attacks against individual liberty outside judicial procedures, de-
portation or exile, or one of the acts prohibited by Article 22 of the
Constitution""4 and, second, the amparo as an original procedure for pro-
tecting the other individual guarantees set forth in the Constitution, be-
sides personal liberty and integrity.
The amparo-libertad consists theoretically of a simple and quick
procedure. This recourse may be had at any hour of the day or night. In
emergencies, it may be transmitted by telegraph to an ordinary judge
within whose jurisdictional area the impugned act has been perpetrated or
is intended to be perpetrated. When the victim is incapacitated and hence
incapable of personally seeking an amparo-libertad, another person may
do so in his behalf, on condition that the victim ratify the petition within
three days. In practice, however, amparo-libertad is not a quick and effec-
tive legal remedy against arbitrary arrest, as was seen in the general arrests
made during the student uprisings in Mexico in 1968.
An ordinary judge has the power to order the "provisional suspen-
sion" of the "impugned act", but he must send the proceedings to a District
Judge so that he may start the trial formally (Articles 38, 39 and 40 of
the Law of Amparo).
The "responsible authority" in the "impugned act" must answer the
charges presented by the injured party by means of a "justified report".
With or without such report, however, the hearing of facts and allegations
is carried out. Generally, the decision is to present a recourse of review
against the decision before the Circuit Tribunals, and, in exceptional cases,
before the Supreme Court when violations of Article 22 of the Constitution
are alleged.
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It may be seen, therefore, that amparo.libertdd is much broader than
the writ of habeas corpus in the United States, since it may be utilized,
not only in cases of arbitrary arrest or threat of detention, but also when
there has been a violation of Article 22 of the Mexican Constitution, which
reads as follows:
Punishment by mutilation and infamy, branding, flogging, beat-
ing with sticks, torture of any kind, excessive fines, confiscation of
property and any other unusual or overhelming penalties are
prohibited.
Attachment proceeding covering the whole or part of the property
of a person made under judicial authority to cover payment of civil
liability arising out of the commission of an offense or to meet taxes
or fines shall not be deemed a confiscation of property.
Capital punishment for political offenses is likewise forbidden;
as regards other offenses, it can only be imposed for high treason com-
mitted during a foreign war, parricide, murder with malice afore-
thought, arson, abduction, highway robbery, piracy, and grave military
offenses.
2) The Amparo Against Laws
Previously, reference was made to judicial review which developed in
Latin America under the influence of American doctrine and jurispru-
dence. The principle of constitutional supremacy in the United States,
undoubtedly inspired the Mexican system of indirect control of the consti-
tutionality of laws. The Amendment Act of 1847 introduced the "Otero
Formula", according to which the amparo is used to test the validity of
laws and regulations (Article 25 of the Mexican Constitution).
The Law of Amparo now in force regulates two constitutional statutory
reviews - the action and the recourse of unconstitutionality:
a) The action: the petitioner may impugn directly ordinary legisla-
tive measures (laws, decrees, regulations, etc.) when he considers that they
are contrary to the Constitution. This action, however, is only valid in the
case of a person directly or indirectly injured by a law or by the initial
application of the law. The parties to this action are: the agraviado
(claimant), the body which has passed the law (the Congress) or the
administrative authority which executes or intends to execute the law in a
"specific case." Decisions may be challenged before the Supreme Court.
b) The recourse of unconstitutionality: this takes the form of a
direct amparo and is applicable against specific rulings or ordinary judges.
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This recourse is available, without the right to further appeal, before the
Supreme Court directly, or before the Circuit Tribunals.
The recourse originally appeared in the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court to harmonize Article 103 of the Constitution (giving the federal
judges exclusive powers in matters related to unconstitutional laws or acts),
with Article 133 (taken almost verbatim from the second paragraph of
Article 6 of the United States Constitution), which obligates ordinary
judges to recognize the supremacy of the Federal Constitution over State
constitutions.
The Supreme Court has concentrated the judicial review of laws in
the Federal Judicial Branch, without affecting the duty of local judges to
apply the provisions of the Mexican Federal Constitution over the provi-
sions of State constitutions in contradiction to the supreme law of the
land. 49
The recourse of unconstitutionalism consists of an analysis of the va-
lidity of the claim and may order measures to satisfy valid claims. The
proceeding may develop into a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
law impugned, or in the rejection of an invalid claim.
The decision in each case (action and recourse) does not result in an
in abstracto declaration of the unconstitutionality of the law impugned,
with effects erga omnes, but rather is limited to ordering that the law
impugned not be applied in detriment of the claimant. The law impugned,
at any rate, will continue in force since the Mexican Federal Judicial
Branch does not have powers to abrogate or derogate a law; these powers
are exclusively reserved to the Federal Congress. In the United States the
case is somewhat different because a Supreme Court decision declaring
the unconstitutionality of a law has virtually the same effect as abroga-
tion. In Mexico, five similar cases are required to suspend the application
of a law (this is called mandatory jurisprudence of the Supreme Court).
Therefore, the amparo against laws is an indirect means of judicial
review of ordinary legislative measures, not a direct means with erga
omnes effects to abrogate a law challenged as unconstitutional, as is the
case in Colombia.
3) Amparo-casaci6n
This is a separate claim to impugn decisions in civil, criminal and
administrative suits and in labor arbitrations, when such decisions are
considered to be in violation of the rules of procedure of the "individual
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guarantees" of the appellant. This action is taken before the Supreme Court
or the Circuit Tribunals.
This last appeal, also called judicial amparo, is a result of mandatory
Supreme Court jurisprudence which broadened the interpretation of Article
14 of the Mexican Constitution of 1857. The Mexican Constitution of 1917,
now in force, recognizes it expressly in Article 14:
No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any
person whatsoever.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions,
or rights without a trial by a duly created court in which the essential
elements of procedure are observed and in accordance with laws issued
prior to the act.
In criminal cases no penalty shall be imposed by mere analogy
or by a priori evidence. The penalty must be decreed in a law in
every respect applicable to the crime in question.
In civil suits the final sentence shall be according to the letter
or the judicial interpretation of the law; in absence of the latter it
shall be based on general principles of law.
The judicial amparo-based on the principle of "control of legality"
or "due process of law"-has come to replace the ordinary cassation
recourse,50 which exists in the other Latin American countries. The cassa-
tion recourse in civil cases existed in Mexico until 1908. In Mexico the
judicial amparo (amparo-casaciin) was established to remedy the lack
of "trust in the unbiased action of the local tribunals."5t At present, this
"amparo-casaci6n" is the most effective Mexican device to stop corruption
and prevarication by ordinary judges.
The Mexican "amparo-casacidn" is similar to the procedure in the
French cassation system, since it has also adopted the procedure of re-
expedition, as follows: if amparo is granted, the judge in the original suit
is obliged to promulgate a new decision in accordance with the guidelines
established by the Supreme Court or by the Circuit Tribunals. In the
Spanish system, on the contrary, only the cassation tribunal reviews or
modifies an earlier decision.
4) The Administrative Amparo
This recourse is available for the protection of the interests of private
parties against acts of the Public Administration and also to impugn final
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decisions of the Federal Fiscal Tribunal, which, as an administrative body
of delegated jurisdition, is empowered to decide cases challenging final
rulings in fiscal and administrative matters (Article 22 of the Organic
Law of the Federal Judicial Branch).
The administrative amparo has two variations:
a. This recourse is used against acts or resolutions of the public
administration, with the exception of acts of decentralized bodies or
corporations in which the state is a participant. Here the amparo has
litigious-administrative jurisdiction not expressly attributed to judicial
bodies or to a mixed body, as in the French State Council. b. But,
if an amparo is obtained against final decisions of the Federal Fiscal
Tribunal, this amparo then takes the form of an administrative cassa.
tion, in accordance with Article 158 of the Law of Amparo in force.
5) The Agrarian Amparo
This recourse is in reality a variation of the administrative amparo.
It has evolved from the amendment to the Law of Amparo of January 1,
1963. It was created for the purpose of establishing special rules to protect
groups of organized peasants in accordance with the Mexican system of
communal agrarian property. It consists of an exceptional procedure, under
the supposition that "they are people who lack legal knowledge and even
the economic means to obtain adequate counseling."
52
AMPARO IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
The Mexican amparo has influenced other legal regimes in Latin
America, which have introduced, this institution as a means of protecting
human rights. No uniformity exists, however, since the institution has
variations peculiar to each country.5
Following Mexico, the first country to adopt the amparo was Guate-
mala in its Constitution of 1879. Subsequently, the following Central Ameri-
can countries adopted it: Honduras, in 1894; El Salvador, in 1886; Nica-
ragua, in 1911; Panama, in 1941; and Costa Rica, in 1946.
In Argentina, the amparo was first included in Article 17 of the
Constitution of the Province of Santa Fe on August 13, 1921. But, in the
national sphere, the creation of the accin de amparo is a recent develop-
ment in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, initiated in the famous
cases of "Angel Siri" (December 17, 1957) and "Samuel Kot" (Septem-
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her 5, 1958).54 On October 16, 1966, National Law No. 16,986 covering
Acci6n de Amparo was promulgated. 5"
In Chile, the writ of habeas corpus, guaranteed by Article 16 of the
Constitution of 1925, is called recourse of amparo in doctrine as well as
in jurisprudence.
Venezuela, in its Constitution of 1961, instituted amparo as a recourse
to protect, before the tribunals, any person in the enjoyment and exercise
of his constitutional rights and guarantees (Article 49).
In its Constitution of 1967, Ecuador adopted the jurisdictional amparo
to protect persons "against any violations of constitutional guarantees"
(Article 28, paragraph 15).
The process of incorporation of amparo in Latin American Constitu-
tions reached its high point in the constitutions of Bolivia and Paraguay
of 1967, since they introduce the recourse of amparo, independently of
the writ of habeas corpus, against illegal acts not only of public authori-
ties, but also of individuals. However, Nicaragua, in its Law of Amparo
of 1950, admitted the amparo against "private persons who restrict per-
sonal liberties" (Article 4).
After more than a century, the Mexican amparo- an institution for
the defense of civil rights against the arbitrary acts of public authorities
(executive, legislative and judicial) - now has been developed in Nica-
ragua, Bolivia and Paraguay into an instrument to protect human rights
against the illegal acts not only of public authorities but also of private
individuals. The same has taken place in connection with the Brazilian
mandado de seguaranqa, the Argentine accidn de amparo and the writ of
habeas corpus in several other countries.
In practice, amparo takes three different forms, as follows:
a) amparo as a synonym for habeas corpus; b) amparo as a means
of protection of the civil rights recognized by a national constitution,
and c) amparo as a general means of protection of human rights and
as a device for testing the constitutionality of laws.
A. Amparo as a Synonym lor Habeas Corpus
In Argentina, the recourse of amparo is analogous to the writ of
habeas corpus and is used exclusively against arbitrary arrest and ir-
regularities in criminal procedures. In Chile, the writ of habeas corpus is
called recourse of amparo and is applied against arbitrary arrest by the
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authorities.5 6 In Mexico the amparo-libertad is synonymous with habeas
corpus as already shown.
B. Amparo as a Means of Protection ol Human Rights Recognized
by the Constitution
Independently of the writ of habeas corpus, the constitutions of
Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela give to the amparo
the character of an instrument for the protection of human rights recog-
nized by the constitutions, similarly to Mexico with the juicio de amparo
and in Brazil with the mandado de seguranga.
The following is an analysis of the amparo in the eleven countries
previously mentioned:
1. Argentina: the Argentine accidn de amparo, since its first ap-
pearance in the Constitution of the Province of Santa Fe, of 1921 (Article
17), has found its way into the other provincial constitutions of Ar-
gentina.57
In the national sphere, the accidn de amparo, as stated earlier, is a
development of Supreme Court jurisprudence. This court has affirmed the
existence of fundamental rights and that these afford protection to all
persons by virtue of being included in the Constitution.58
According to Professor Fix Zamudio, the "acciin de amparo", has
the following characteristics:
a) It is available when there is a present or imminent attack against
fundamental rights found in the Constitution, independent of the
recourse of habeas corpus to protect individual liberty against ar-
bitrary arrest; b) when the attack, coming from authorities or
private persons, constitutes "an arbitrary act in manifested form";
and, c) it is also available when there is no other legal means to
defend the violated right, or if irreparable damage would be caused
by submitting the case to ordinary procedures. 9
In summary, the action of amparo consists of a recourse granted to
all persons "against all acts or omissions of public authorities which, in a
present or imminent form, injure, restrict, alter or threaten, with arbitrari-
ness or manifest illegality, the rights or guarantees explicitly or implicitly
recognized by the Constitution. 60 This action is also available against the
so-called "pressure groups" (labor unions, for example), in compliance
with the Supreme Court jurisprudence in the "Kot case." 61
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The accidn de amparo may be requested by any real or artificial
person, directly or by proxy, before the ordinary judge who has jurisdic-
tion in the area where the execution of the alleged "arbitrary or illegal
manifest act" took place. The claim must be presented in writing. Once the
claim has been accepted, the judge will request a "circumstancial report"
from responsible authority. Within three days, the judge will rule regarding
the existence or non-existence of the injury, restriction, alteration or ar-
bitrary threat which jeopardizes the constitutional rights or guarantees of
a person. The decision is final. Court costs are paid by the losing party.
The Argentine accidn de amparo is similar to the Anglo-Saxon in-
junction, in the sense that it is not available when "there are recourses
or administrative remedies which permit obtaining the protection of the
constitutional right or guarantees in question.62
2. Bolivia: The Constitution of 1967, besides reaffirming the tradi.
tional writ of habeas corpus against arbitrary arrest, has also instituted
the recourse of amparo, which is available "against the illegal acts or the
forbidden omissions of officials or private persons which restrict, suppress
or threaten to restrict or suppress the rights and guarantees of persons
which are recognized by this Constitution and the Laws" (Article 19).
This recourse may be sought by a person who considers himself "injured",
or by any other person representing him, before the superior courts of
the capitals of the departments and before municipal judges in the provin-
ces. The State Attorney has the power to exercise this recourse ex officio
when the injured person has not already done so or could not do so. The
general procedure for the recourse is extremely summary.
3. Costa Rica: The Constitution of 1949 not only ratified the re-
course of habeas corpus to protect individual liberty (Article 48, paragraph
1), but also for the first time introduced the recourse of amparo, the pur-
pose of which is "to maintain or reestablish the exercise of the other
rights established in this Constitution" (Article 48, paragraph 2). This
recourse may be requested by any person, not only in defense of his funda-
mental rights and liberties, but also in defense of the social rights recog-
nized by the constitution.' 3
4. Ecuador: The Constitution of 1967 instituted, for the first time,
as one of the human rights, "the right to the jurisdictional amparo against
any violation of the constitutional guarantees, without affecting the duty
incumbent upon the Public Powers to safeguard the observance of the
Constitution and laws" (Article 28, number 15). The amparo jurisdic-
cional is not only independent of the recourse of habeas corpus against
arbitrary arrest (paragraph h, sub-paragraph 18, Article 18), but also
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independent of the recourse which is granted to any real or artificial
person to appear before the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees to
question the legality of any action (Article 219, paragraph 3). Unfor-
tunately, the Constitution of 1967 was abrogated in July, 1970 by President
Velasco Ibarra.
5. El Salvador: In its Constitution of 1886, this country introduced
the juicio de amparo (amparo by direct claim), which, similar to the
Mexican amparo, fulfills a triple mission: as an instrument to protect civil
rights recognized in the Construction; as a writ of habeas corpus against
arbitrary arrest, and as a device for testing the constitutionality of laws.
In the Constitution of 1950, however, this triple mission of the Salvadoran
amparo was discontinued.
The Constitution of 1962 grants to persons the recourse of amparo
before the Supreme Court to impugn "the violation of the rights given
to them in the present Constitution" (Article 221).64 Moreover, this
particular constitution again instituted the writ of habeas corpus "when
any authority or individual illegally restricts individual liberty" (Article
164) ; this recourse is brought before the Supreme Court or before Cdmatas
de Segunda lntancia.
6. Guatemala: This country introduced the Mexican amparo in its
Constitution of 1879 and confirmed it in the constitutional amendments of
1921 and 1927. 65 In the Constitution of 1945, the amparo had three
functions: to protect constitutional human rights; to act as a writ of
habeas corpus against arbitrary arrest, and as a means of testing the
constitutionality of laws, regulations and other acts. In the Constitution of
1965, amparo had as a key function, the maintenance of individual
guarantees and the invulnerability of constitutional precepts (Article 79).
The Constitution of 1965 has definitely separated the three institu.
tions: first, an amparo may be requested by any person in order to
"maintain or to have restored to him the exercise of the rights and
guarantees established by the Constitution" (Article 80) ; second, the writ
of habeas corpus known as "recourse of personal presence", is available
against arbitrary arrest; and, third, the "recourse of unconstitutionality",
which is available, before the Court of Unconstitutionality, "against laws
or Government measures of a general nature which are partially or totally
unconstitutional."
According to the terms of the Constitutional Law of Amparo, Habeas
Corpus and Unconstitutionality, amparo may be pressed by a person
under the following conditions, among others: a) to maintain or restore
the exercise of the rights and guarantees established in the Constitution
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and the laws of the Republic of Guatemala; b) to declare in specific cases
that a law, regulation, resolution or act of a public authority is not binding
on the petitioner since such a measure contravenes or restricts rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or laws; c) to impugn acts, not merely
legislative, of the Congress which violate constitutional rights, and, d) to
impugn acts of a public authority which are manifestly abusive or illegal. 67
7. Honduras: Beginning in 1894 this country adopted amparo by
direct claim similar to Mexico. The Constitution of 1965, similarly to that
of Guatemala, separates the recourse of habeas corpus - against arbitrary
arrest - from the recourse of amparo. According to the Constitution, any
injured person, or anyone representing him, has the right to seek the
recourse of amparo to maintain or regain the exercise of his constitutional
rights and guarantees. (Article 58, paragraph 1).
8. Nicaragua: The amparo was adopted by the Constitution of
1911. The Constitution of 1950, now in force, also separates the writ of
habeas corpus - against arbitrary arrest - from amparo (Article 41).
The Law of Amparo of 1950, which has the category of a constitutional
law, established the legal means to exercise the right of amparo for the
purpose of maintaining and re-establishing the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion and constitutional laws.
The "right of amparo" is available in the following cases:
a) Against violations of the Constitution and constitutional laws, by
laws, decrees, resolutions, orders, mandates or acts of any official authority,
public corporations or their agents; b) to test the constitutionality of a
law or decree referring to matters not properly before tribunals or judges
and which, when applied in specific cases, injure the rights of any person;
c) against arrest or threat of arrest by order of any public official or
authority; d) against acts of private persons restricting individual liberty,
and, e) against orders of arrest of a person who, although not yet arrested,
attempts to escape the effects of such order.68
9. Panama: The amparo de las garantias individuales (amparo of
individual guarantees) appeared in the Constitution of 1941, in a special
chapter called "Institutions of Guarantee", which also included the people's
action to test the constitutionality of laws, and litigious-administrative
jurisdiction. 69
The Constitution of 1946 provides five different institutions: 1) The
habeas corpus, which protects physical liberty against arbitrary arrest;
2) amparo of constitutional guarantees, which protects the remaining civil
rights stipulated in the Constitution; 3) the objecicn de inezequibilidad
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(Executive veto) against unconstitutional laws; 4) the "advisory opinions
on constitutionality", and, 5) the "recourse of unconstitutionality." 7°
Article 51 of the Panamanian Constitution states that any person is
entitled to impugn an order of any public official which violates con.
stitutional rights and guarantees.71
10. Paraguay: The Constitution of 1967 not only reaffirms the
recourse of habeas corpus against illegal arrest (Article 78), but also has
instituted the recourse of anmparo for the first time. Article 77 establishes
that any person, who cannot obtain legal relief by ordinary means due
to the urgency of the case, is entitled to appear before any ordinary
judge to seek an amparo against an illegal act or omission, when he
considers himself in serious jeopardy or in imminent danger thereof, in
violation of a constitutional or of a legal right or guarantee.
According to the Constitution, the procedure will. be brief, summary,
free and public, and the judge will have the power to safeguard the right
or guarantee, or to immediately re-establish the legal situation infringed.
The Paraguayan recourse of amparo appears as an extraordinary or emer-
gency recourse to protect fundamental constitutional rights and guarantees.
But, in addition, this recourse of amparo is not only available against acts
of public authorities, but also against acts of private persons, in the same
way as the Bolivian and Nicaraguan amparo.
11. Venezuela: The recourse, action or claim of amparo was first
instituted in the Constitution of 1961, which states (Article 49) that "the
Tribunal will protect all persons in the enjoyment and exercise of the
rights and guarantees which the Constitution establishes in conformity
with the law. The procedure will be brief and summary, and the com-
petent judge will have the power to re-establish immediately the legal
situation infringed."72
The Venezuelan amparo is, therefore, an institution to protect
fundamental constitutional rights and guarantees. This is a recourse in-
dependent of the writ of habeas corpus to protect individual liberty against
arbitrary arrest. The writ of habeas corpus, incidentally, was reaffirmed
by the fifth transitory provision of the Venezuelan Constitution of 1961,
which states: "any person who is deprived or restricted of his liberty in
violation of the constitutional guarantees has the right to appear before the
ordinary criminal judges to obtain a writ of habeas corpus."
The Venezuelan amparo is available against any act which violates a
constitutional right, be it either of a public authority (national, state or
municipal), or of a legislative or judicial body. The purpose of the amparo
is mainly to reestablish immediately the legal situation infringed. 73
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C. Amparo as a Device for Protecting Human Rights and Question-
ing the Constitutionality of Laws
In addition to Mexico there are only three other Latin American
countries which have amparo against unconstitutional laws: Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua. In these countries the amparo is used not only
as an instrument for protection of constitutional civil rights, but also as a
means of impugning unconstitutional laws.
In the Guatemala Constitution of 1965 (Article 80), any person has
the right to petition an amnparo not only to retain or restore the exercise
of his constitutional rights and guarantees, but also to obtain a declaration
that, "in specific suits, a law, regulation, resolution or act of any public
authority does not bind the petitioner, if it contravenes or restricts any of
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution." 74
The Honduran Constitution of 1965, in the same way as the Guate-
malan Constitution, grants the right to any "aggrieved person" to seek the
recourse of amparo, not only "to maintain or restore the exercise of the
rights and guarantees that the Constitution establishes," but also to obtain
a declaration that, "in specific cases, a law, resolution or act of a public
authority does not bind the petitioner, if it contravenes or restricts any
of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution" (Article 58).
Finally, the Nicaraguan Constitution of 1950 establishes the principle
that the laws which regulate the exercise of constitutional guarantees and
rights will be null if they diminish, restrict or adulterate such guarantees
and rights (Article 325, paragraph 2). The Law of Amparo, which is
considered a constitutional law, admits that amparo is available against
"the violation of the Constitution or of constitutional laws resulting from
laws, decrees, resolutions, orders, mandates or acts of any official authority,
public corporation or their agents" (Article 1, paragraph 2).
TOWARDS A LATIN AMERICAN AMPARO
Since the Mexican amparo has spread considerably throughout Latin
America, as evidenced by its adoption in the constitutions of twelve coun-
tries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela), the es-
tablishment of a common Latin American amparo has been proposed as
an essential device for the protection of constitutional human rights.
Since the first Symposium on Comparative Law, held in Montevideo,
August 15-17, 1962, discussions have been held concerning the necessity
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of establishing a common basis for procedures in actions of amparo and
similar recourses.7s The Third Latin American Symposium on Procedural
Law, held at Sio Paulo, Brazil, in September 1962, recommended the
preparation of a draft containing adequate uniform bases to regulate, in
all Latin American countries, the jurisdictional protection of human rights,
according to the Mexican pattern of amparo and the Brazilian mandado
de seguranqa.74
The Fourth Latin American Symposium on Procedural Law, held at
Caracas, Venezuela, March 27 to April 2, 1967, approved two important
propositions: one, presented by the Ecuadoran jurist Isaac Lovato, sug-
gested that the Latin American Institute of Procedural Law prepare a
draft that "could serve as a basis for legislative promotion in the Latin
American countries to establish a specific legal device to protect funda-
mental human rights," and, two, suggesting that "fundamental human
rights should be protected judicially by a legal remedy especially created
for this purpose."17 In addition, several Latin American jurists have frankly
advocated the establishment of a fundamental legal device to protect human
rights in its region.
The Argentinian jurist, Carlos Sanchez Viamonte, has favored the
acceptance of an American habeas corpus, as broad as that existing in
Brazil, that is one to protect all constitutional human rights.7
The Brazilian jurist, J. M. Othon Sidou, prepared a draft of a uni-
form regulatory law for an American and universal amparo, in order to
make effective Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.79
The Mexican jurist, Hector Fix Zamudio, presented a proposal on
March 28, 1967, before the Fourth Latin American Symposium on Pro-
cedural Law, which was approved as Proposal VI, in the following terms:
"The action, recourse or claim of amparo, as found in numerous Latin
American Constitutions (similar to the Brazilian mandado de seguraowa,
with which it has many points in common), constitutes the most effective
and direct means of protecting all the fundamental constitutional rights
not covered by habeas corpus. Therefore, it would be advisable to adopt
it in those legal systems in which it does not exist, since it cannot be
advantageously substituted by other procedural remedies" . . .80
Thus the question is whether or not there is a necessity to establish
a Latin American amparo to protect constitutional human rights, inde-
pendently of the writ of habeas corpus and other ordinary procedural
recourses.
The participants in the Seminar on Amparo, Habeas Corpus and Other
Similar Remedies (which took place in Mexico, August 15-18, 1961, spon-
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sored by the United Nations), recognized that "the full exercise of funda-
mental human rights is a basic requirement for human peace and brother.
hood." They likewise pointed out that amparo, the writ of habeas corpus,
the mandado de segurana, and the other means of defending and safe-
guarding human rights "are legal institutions, eternal and essential, for
the survival of any civilized community." s
If the above has-been recognized by distinguished jurists, why, then,
would it not be useful to establish a common Latin American amparo?
Three main reasons may be advanced in favor of the establishment
of a common Latin American amparo:
1. The amparo in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Vene-
zuela, and the mandado de seguranpa in Brazil, are complete legal remedies
for the protection of fundamental human rights recognized in the con-
stitutions. This system of protection of human rights is complemented by
the writ of habeas corpus to defend individual liberty against arbitrary
arrest. In Mexico, not only amparo-libertad (equivalent to habeas corpus),
but also the claim of amparo, are good devices for the protection of civil
rights.
But, unfortunately, in Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Haiti, Peru, Dominican
Republic and Uruguay, the procedural and constitutional recourses to pro-
tect civil rights do not have the broad application of amparo or "mandado
de seguranca".
Possibly for these reasons the Codification Division of the Legal De-
partment of the Organization of American States (OAS), concluded in
1960 that "the recourse of amparo is really the only procedural institu-
tion which fully reflects the idea expressed" in Article XVIII of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948.82
2. At this time, when the American countries are attempting to
establish an Inter-American regime for the protection of human rights
similar to that established by the Council of Europe in 1950, it appears
advisable that Latin American countries advance more towards uniformity
in their national procedural devices for the protection of human rights
included in the American Convention on Human Rights. 3
In the Ninth International American Conference held in Bogota in
1948, Article XVIII was included in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, at the suggestion of Mexico. The suggestion
was adopted by the American States as Resolution XXX, as follows:
Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his
legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief
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procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority
that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.
Similarly, "amparo" was included in Article 8 of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, approved and proclaimed by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in Paris on December 10, 1948, as follows:
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law.
Subsequently, the "Declaration of Santiago, Chile" (approved by the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Re-
publics, of 1959), affirmed that "the human rights incorporated in the
legislations of the American States should be protected by effective ju-
dicial means. 84
The Inter-American Commission of Jurists in its fourth meeting held
in Santiago, Chile, in 1959, included in its Draft of the American Con-
vention of Human Rights the following Article XXVIII: "any person is
entitled to an effective, simple and rapid remedy before the competent
national tribunals, to protect him against acts violating his fundamental
rights as recognized by the constitution or by the laws."85 This article
was included in the Draft of the Inter-American Convention on Protec-
tion of Human Rights, approved by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in its Ninth Session held July 10, 1968.86
Also, on December 16, 1966, the American countries approved, at
the United Nations General Assembly, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Consequently, they agreed to: a) "ensure
that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity;" b) "ensure that
any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined
by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy," and, c) "ensure that
the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted."8 7
Finally, the American Convention on Human Rights, as approved by
some Member States of the OAS, the 22nd of November, 1969, recog-
nized the right to judicial protection, which includes the am paro, the
writ of habeas corpus, the mandado de seguranca, and other judicial
recourses to protect specific human rights.
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Latin American countries could better comply with their moral and
legal obligations if they adopted a harmonious and uniform system of
amparo, which would embody the history and practical applications of
the remedy. This, of course, could be attained by the adoption of a model
amparo system which could be gradually accepted by the legislatures in
Latin American countries without the necessity of a treaty on the matter.
The work of the Inter.American entities to protect human rights-
the Commission and the Court-would thus be facilitated if a common
Latin American amparo existed instead of multiple legal devices.
3. The Latin American countries have begun a period, although de-
layed and slow, of economic integration. This process demands, as one of
its requirements sine qua non, harmony and uniformity in the legislation
of the participating States. Accordingly, the Latin American amparo and
the other devices for the judicial protection of human rights should be, a-
soon as possible, harmonized and made uniform as indicated above.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Inspired by the liberal constitutional examples of France and the
United States, the Latin American countries have, since the beginning
of their independence, embodied bills of civil and political rights in their
constitutions.
However, the introduction of "guarantees" to protect civil rights and
liberties was a gradual development of constitutional law in Latin Amer-
ica. The legal protection of human rights was at first limited to the Anglo-
American writ of habeas corpus to protect individual freedom against
arbitrary arrest. Eventually, other constitutional devices were adopted,
such as the judicial review, the judicial action against public authorities
and the amparo, among others.
2. Even though all judicial recourses are useful instruments for
the protection of human rights, it is necessary to give priority "to those
which have proven their efficacy in the prompt and sure protection of
human liberty." These judicial devices are: the writ of habeas corpus,
the amparo in Mexico and other Latin American countries, the mandado
de seguranqa in Brazil, the judicial review, the people's action against
unconstitutionality of laws, and the "action of guarantees."
3. The writ of habeas corpus is one of the traditional and inherent
remedies to protect individual liberty against arbitrary arrest. This Anglo-
American device was embodied gradually in Latin American constitu-
tions.
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4. In order to broaden the writ of habeas corpus so as to protect
individual liberty against arbitrary arrest, the Brazilian Constitution of
1934 created the writ called "mandado de seguranwa" for the purpose of
judicially protecting the other fundamental rights and guarantees rec-
ognized by the Constitution. In theory, this device is an extraordinary
procedure for the prompt and efficient protection of civil rights against
illegality, or abuse of power by any public official.
5. In their first constitutions, the Latin American countries adopted
the U. S. system of judicial review to test the constitutionality of laws.
The general procedure consists of a declaration a posteriori requested by
the party involved in any specific suit; a declaration of unconstitution-
ality, however, does not derogate the law challenged with effects erga
omnes. As an exception, several Latin American countries (Cuba, Ecua-
dor and Guatemala) adopted the "European system" creating special
constitutional tribunals.
6. The People's Action consists of the privilege given to any citi-
zen to appear before the Supreme Court of Justice to impugn the un-
constitutionality of a law, even though he may not be directly affected by
the particular law. This procedure, originating in Colombia, has been
adopted by the countries which previously constituted "Great Colombia"
(Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela). In this procedure, when
the Supreme Court declares a law to be unconstitutional, it produces ef-
fects erga omnes, resulting in the abrogation of the law.
7. The amparo as a means of testing the constitutionality of laws
(judicial review), was introduced in Mexico in 1847. In accordance
with this procedure, only interested parties may press the remedy. How-
ever, the declaration of unconstitutionality of a law by judicial bodies,
only results in the non.application of the impugned law in a specific
case. Besides Mexico, only three countries follow this method instead of
U. S. judicial review: Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala.
8. In Latin America, litigious-administrative jurisdiction (con-
entieux-administratij) is another legal device to protect human rights
against public administrative jurisdiction of ordinary judicial tribunals.
In some special instances, litigious administrative jurisdiction is conferred
upon special entities which are independent of both the administrative
and the judicial branches.
9. The "Action of Guarantees" is a new judicial recourse to pro-
tect human rights recognized by some constitutions. In general, it con-
sists of a public action by anyone to prosecute officials accused of vio-
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lating constitutional rights and guarantees. This is a typical device in
Guatemala and Honduras.
10. In Mexico, federal constitutional protection of "individual guar-
antees" started in 1847, when the "Amendment Act" to the Constitution
of 1824 was promulgated. Nevertheless, the historical background of the
amparo dates back to the Yucatan State Draft Constitution drafted in
1840 by Manuel Crescencio Rejon, who proposed the remedy to protect
human rights against acts by legislative and executive bodies contrary
to the Constitution.
The amparo as a procedural device was reaffirmed in the Mexican
Federal Constitution of 1857 and 1917, the latter still in force. Its pur-
pose is to protect any person, before the federal tribunals, against legis-
lative and administrative acts and judicial acts of lower courts which
violate the individual guarantees set forth in the first 29 articles of the
Constitution.
The Mexican amparo--initially conceived as a recourse to protect
"individual guarantees" only-has also been used to fill in some con-
stitutional gaps. Certainly, the Mexican amparo has had to be used as
a writ of habeas corpus (amparo.libertad), as a means of judicial review
(the amparo against law), as an extraordinry recourse of legality (due
process of law), as a recourse of cassation (amparo-casacidn), as a special
recourse of administrative jurisdiction (amparo-administrativo), and even
as an agrarian appeal (amparo agrario).
11. The Mexican amparo has influenced other legal systems in Latin
America, which have introduced this institution as a means of protecting
human rights. No uniformity exists, however, since the institution has
variations peculiar to each country.
Taking into account its field of action, the amparo in Latin America
has three distinct applications:
a) Amparo as a synonym of habeas corpus: Argentina, Chile and
Mexico.
b) Amparo as a means of protecting human rights recognized by
the Constitution: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela, and
c) Amparo as a device for protecting human rights and questioning
the constitutionality of laws: Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua.
12. After more than a century, the Mexican wnparo protecting con-
stitutional human rights against the arbitrary acts of public authorities,
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has been broadened in Nicaragua, Bolivia and Paraguay. In these coun.
tries the amparo is used not only against illegal acts of public authorities,
but also against those of private persons. This has also occurred with the
Brazilian mandado de seguranca, the Argentine accidn de amparo and
the writ of habeas corpus in several other countries.
13. Since the Mexican amparo has been embodied in the constitu.
tional systems of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Vene-
zuela, the estblishment of a common Latin American amparo has been
proposed as an essential device for the protection of constitutional human
rights.
Thus the question is whether or not there is a real necessity to estab-
lish a common Latin American amparo to protect constitutional human
rights, independently of the writ of habeas corpus and other ordinary
procedural remedies.
Three main reasons may be presented in favor of this idea:
a) The amparo is really the only complete procedural device which,
together with the mandado de seguranwa, fully reflects the essence of
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article
XVIII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of
1948. In other words, the amparo and the mandado de seguranqa, are
the most complete judicial remedies for the protection of fundamental
human rights recognized in the constitutions of Latin America.
b) At this time, when the American countries are attempting to
establish an Inter-American regime for the protection of human rights
similar to that established by the Council of Europe in 1950, it seems
advisable that Latin American countries move forward toward uniformity
with regard to the local procedural devices for the protection of human
rights.
The American Convention on Human Rights, approved by some
Member States of the Organization of American States, the 22nd of
November, 1969, recognizes the right to judicial protection, which includes
the amparo, the writ of habeas corpus, the mandado de seguranpa, and
other judicial recourses to protect specific human rights.
c) Latin American countries could better comply with their moral
and legal obligations if they adopted a harmonious and uniform system
of amparo, which would embody the history and practical applications
of the remedy. This, of course, could be attained by the adoption of a
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
model amaparo system which could be gradually accepted by the legislature
of Latin American countries, without the necessity of a treaty on the
matter.
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